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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JOHN R. SWAUGER,

Appellant)
vs.

\

Case No. 7316

W. C. LAWLER,

Respondent.\

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is upon the judgment roll and records of
this case in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County.
The action .ts one for the sum of $1000.00 and interest
on a loan made December 3, 1945 to the respondent by the
appellant. (R. 1). An answer was filed by the respondent,
being a general Jenial and containing no affirmative defense

(R. 5).
Pursuant to a proper demand for trial, due and regular
notice of the time and place of trial was given to the defendant
in conformance 'vith the duly established rules of the Third
District Court.
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On April 7, 1948 the case came on regularly for trial
before the court, Judge Clarence E. Baker presiding over said
trial. Both parties appeared at said trial by their counsel.
Appellant had travelled many miles from Salmon, Idaho,
having left his business there to attend trial, (R. 35) and
testified on his own behalf as to the loan and non-payment
thereof. Respondent failed to appear or to notify the court
of his inability to be present. Judge Baker for good cause
thereupon overruled respondent's counsel's motion for a continuance and proceeded with trial. After hearing the evidence
and the plaintiff submitting to cross-examination, judgment
was granted to John R. Swauger, plaintiff and appellant,
April 7, 1948, for the sum prayed. Said order was made in
the present of counsel for both parties.
Findings of Fact and Judgment were duly served upon
respondent's attorneys on April 8th and signed and filed by
Judge Baker on April 9th (R. 13-15). Nqtice of judgment
and demand for payment thereof was served upon respondent's
attorneys on Apnl 9th.
Under date of April 12th, 1948 respondent's attorneys
s~rved

and filed a ((Motion for New Trial," (R. 19) setting
forth substantially the statutory grounds and stating that
affidavits were to be filed. No affidavit in support thereof
was filed within the permissive five day period, or at all. After
according respondent ample opportunity to file an affidavit
in support of the motion for new trial, said motion was duly
called up for hearing for May 22, 1948 (R. 20).
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On May 22nd said motion for new trial was. argued by
counsel of record for both parties and Judge Baker in the
presence of counsel thereupon entered his Order, May 22,
1948, denying said motion for new trial (R. 21).
Execution was issued to enforce payment of the judgment
and on June 17, 1948 respondent's Mercury station wagon was
levied upon by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County and impounded.
On June 22, 1948, respondent made an affidavit and motion
to quash the execution and noticed the matter for argument
for June 28th. On said date neither respondent nor his counsel
appeared and the motion was stricken from the calendar (R.
26).
On July 8th, 92 days after trial of the case and the Judge's
oral order granting judgment and 90 days after entry of
written judgment, respondent served and filed a ((Motion to
Open or Vacate Judgment," (R. 30) and an affidavit to
support the motion, the same date calling up his motion for
argument on August 5th (R. 31). Said motion was resisted
(R. 35-36). On said date the motion was argued by both
counsel and taken under advisement. By minute order dated
October 15, 1948, (R. 34) Judge Baker vacated and set aside
the judgment thereby permitting respondent to have a new
trial.
Demand for trial was at once made and on December 6,
1948 an C(Amended Answer" was filed asserting a new and
different defense alleging a purported corporate investment,
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an entirely new theory, which was abandoned at trial and
excluded from the Findings of Fact and from the Second
Amended Answer filed after trial of the case (R. · 48).
Upon re-trial of the case, over objections of appellant,
before a different Judge, the issues were found against appellant and judgment of ((no cause of action" entered January 10,
1949 (R. 53).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. The District Court was without jurisdiction to hear

the motion to vacate and grant the new trial.
2. The Order denying the Motion for New Trial was
res adjudicata as to the issues involved in vacating the judg-

ment and granting thereby a new trial.
3. The defe_,ldant is guilty of latches tn failing to file
his affidavit in support of the motion for new trial and hence
barred from later asserting such.
4. The Cour~ erred and abused its discretion in granting
the Motion to Vacate the Judgment.
5. The Court erred and abused its discretion in permitting
the amendment of the Answer in said case.
ARGUMENT I.

The District Court was without jurisdiction to hear the
motion to vacate the judgment and grant thereby a new trial.
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.On May 22, 194g the defendant's motion for
argued before the court by counsel on both sides
denied (R. 21). Full and ample opportunity
to the defendant to assert any grounds which
sufficient to warrant a new trial.

new trial was
and thereupon
was presented
he considered

By the Motion to Vacate Judgment filed July 8, l948 the
defendant in essence was seeking a rehearing on the motion
for a new trial. It is the function of the Supreme Court to
review on appeal, by proper procedure, the granting or: denying
of that motion for new trial. The District Court was without
jurisdiction thereon.
In the case of Luke vs. Coletnan, 113 Pac. 1023; 38 Utah
383, a very similar situation developed. Judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. A motion for new trial was
filed, heard and submitted October 17, 1908. On October
28th the motion was overruled. December 19th the plaintiff
filed a petition and motion to grant a rehearing and reargument
of the motion for new trial. Said motion was not acted upon
until June 3, 1909 when -it was denied. ·
Before the Supreme Court it was urged that the appeal
filed November 4, 1909 was not taken within time. The
plaintiff urged that the finality of the judgment was suspended
by the pendency of the motion for rehearing. Your Supreme
1

Court held:

CCWe think the District Court had not the power to
entertain such a motion. It is unknown to our practice. In California, where the practice relating to
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

new trials is similar to ours, it is firmly established
that the Court has no power to reopen the question
of granting or denying a motion for a new trial after
disposing of it."
In the next place, the power of the district court .
to rehear and re-examine the cause was once invoked
by plaintiff's first application for a retrial. After the
application was denied, to then also permit a petition
to rehear and re-examine the order denying the motion
is in effect to allow the limited time within a motion
for a new trial may be made to be enlarged and to
render the proceedings after judgment interrninable.
There must be some point where the losing party
turned over to the appellate court for redress. Coombs
v. Hibberd, supra. We think the district court was
without jurisdiction to entertain the application for
rehearing; that the judgment became final '\vhen the
court, on the 28th day of October, 1908, denied the
motion for a new trial; and that the appeal taken on
the 4th day of November, 1909, was therefore too late."
cc

This decision has not been modified or reversed. Then
as now, there existed what is our Section 104-14-4, Utah Code
Annotated, 194') in substantially identical language. To
permit the proceeding followed by Judge Baker in this present
case, leads to chaos. No certainty of status can be assured
to a client. The orderly procedure of appeal to your Court
is thwarted.
It is pertinent to observe that no steps have been taken
to change or recall the motion denying a new trial. Thus
two diametrically opposed orders of the court still stand.
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ARGlJMENT II - III
The Order denying the Motion for Netv Trial (R. 21)
iJ 1'es ajudicata as to the issues raised by the motion. Among
the grounds stated for the said Motion are these:

(a) Irregularity in the proceedings of the Court, and
of the adverse party, and in the orders of the Court, and
abuse of discretion by which the defendant was prevented
from having a fair trial.
(b) Accident and surprise which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against.
(c) Newly discovered evidence, material for· the defendant, which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial.
These same tssues were again raised by the Motion to
Vacate the Judgment and the accompanying affidavit: By
hearing and granting said last motion, the court failed to
abide by its earlier decision on the same issues. The defendant
was given two clear chances to raise and argue the same legal
principles involved.
All of the facts stated in the belated affidavit were known
to the defendant c-~.nd his legal counsel prior to the time of filing
the motion for new trial on April 12, 1948. This is established by the affidavit (R. 28) wherein it states that the
defendant on his return to Salt Lake City on April 7th (timmediately contacted his attorney."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'

Still it was not· until July 8, 1948-, after defendant had
failed in _h~s ·effort under purported bankruptcy proceedings
(

.

'

\

(R.- 22) to resain the Mercury Station Wagon impounde?
by the Sheriff pursuant to th~ execut~on, th3;t any affidavit
-

-"

-

-

was made or filed on the facts. By dilatory conduct the
defendant and his counseL stalled and delayed the proceedings.
Absolutely no excuse is shown in the record for not filing
the affidavit in time for_ the Court to have the same before
it when considering the Motion for ~New Trial. Obviously
the purported grounds must not have been stated to his counsel
by the defendant.
I

,

>

''

''

J

This is a clear case where the defendant should be
estopped, because ,of hi~ .. latches, _ from ass~rting the plea for_
equitable relief 92 ~days a~ter"theJ judgment ~idered in ApriL,
The basic maxim of ((clean hands">-applies: He· who seeks.
~quity

should -do equi_ry,. and shou~d avail himself of the relief
w,ithin a reasona~le .time. , T!Ie delay of months incurred
~erein was wholly :unreas9nable._ (~~e Mcfl4illan t:JS. Forsythe,:
47 Ut. 571; 154 P. 959).
This appell2nt has suffered grievously. .Jn accord with
the established rules of trial, he left his business in Salmon,
Idaho, and attended at Salt Lake City, Utah on the date set.
By the rehearing arid reversal on· the motion ~or new trial,
Judge Baker' erroneously forced him to again travel, in the
dead of winter, the lohg distance and to again appear at triaf
and meet, !not the pleadings filed originally, but a defense of
which he was not previously apprised by any existing pleadings.
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.

The original answer (R. 5) in January was only a general
denial. The Amended Answer (R. 41) filed after the judgment had been vacated, set forth a purported affirmative
defense rejected by the court. Finally, after judgment, a Second
Amended Answer was filed (R. 48) setting forth an entirely
different theory. Here again, we urge that the defendant was
guilty of latches in complying with the fundamental rule of
a motion to vacate judgment, that a valid defense be promptly
asserted. Apparently the defendant had not honestly advised
his counsel of the facts of the case at any stage of the proceedings until the final, second trial. By this measure may
the worth of his Affidavit be judged.
ARGUMENT IV.
The court e11~ed in granting the !Hotion to f7 acate Judgnzent. Practically 997o of the cases wherein a judgment has
been vacated under section 104-14-4 are default judgments.
This case is not such. The defendant's counsel duly appeared
at the trial and cross-examined the plaintiff. No irregularities
on the part of the court at the first trial have been asserted,

as none existed.
It is our position further that notice of the time of trial
having been duly given in conformance with the rules of
the court, and it being acknowledged by the defendant in his
affidavit through his third counsel of record, that he knew
of the time cf tr1al some seven days prior to the date thereof,
that he was not entitled to have the relief prayed for. His
counsel was diligent in advising him of the time and place
of trial.
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Your Supreme Court in the case of Campbell vs. Union
Savings & lnvest"tlent Company, 63 Ut. 366; 226 Pac. 190,
held that even in. a default judgment matter the court wquld
not set aside the judgment so entered inasmuch as the rules
of the court had been complied with as to the giving of notice
to the parties litigant of the time of trial. It is obvious that
such rnust be foliowed, otherwise the district court would be
constantly imposed upon by applications of this nature whereby
after setting aside other cases and attending at the time of trial,
together with the one party litigant, the court would be
requesed to give to the defendant additional time and additional consideration in the trial of a lawsuit.
Particularly in this case we feel that the defendant is
bound because competent legal counsel of the firm engaged
by the defendant appeared and cross-examined the plaintiff
and investigated the issues which they subsequnently raised.
No allegation of neglect, omission or mistake by his attorneys
has been raised.
The only reason why the defendant was not in attendance
was that he carelessly and recklessly conducted himself so
as to be absent. He is presumed to have intended the result
which followed his conduct. Only his self-serving affidavit
tends to excuse his absence from trial.
In the case of Peterson vs. Crosier, 29 Utah 235; 81 Pac.
860, a defendant, againt whom judgment had been taken,
sought to have the judgment vacated upon the basis that had he
attended the tri3.1 he would have lost his employment. That
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ground was denied by your court. The defendant Lawler
in this particular case finds himself practically in the same
situation, except that he was personally represented by legal
counsel at the trtt-.1. 1-fr. Lawler preferred to attend to other
business by reason of a bad check issued to him, knowing of
the time of trial, the areas ivolved and, if his alleged physical
condition does exist, such was also known to him. The plaintiff,
Mr. s~'auger, and his father came from Salmon, Idaho to
attend at the time of trial, set aside their other business and
paid their expenses of transportation, lodging and necessary
costs in attending the trial at the time set by this court. Legal
counsel and the court set aside other matters to attend the trial.
It would be manifestly unjust, on the merits of this
matter, to ratify the granting of the new trial for the reason
that the defendant had the benefit of cross examination of
the plaintiff and then amended his answer so as to present
to the court the purported defense referred to in the affidavit.
The only issue ~efore the court at the time of the first trial
was the execution of the loan for $1000.00, as all the defendant
filed was a general denial of the plaintiff's complaint. See:
Peterson vs. Croszer (supra).
No place in the pleadings does the defendant offer to do
equity in this matter. The records in this case will show that
nothing was done by way of this motion to vacate until the
nintieth day after written judgment and then not until the
Sheriff of Salt Lake County had impounded the defendant's
station wagon pursuant to an execution duly issued by the
court. Now he has imposed upon the court the burden of a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rehearing on the motion denying a new trial and without
seeking to do equity himself. Even if such second trial were
legally, available to him, he has wrongfully imposed upon the
plaintiff the cost and expetfse of additional travel to Salt Lake
to attend at the trial and re-litigation of the matters already
adjudicated.
Additional cases may be cited to affirm the general rule
that a judgment once entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the

prese~1ce

of counsel for both parties, after

introduction of evidence at a time duly set and noticed, pursuant
to the court's rules, will not be set aside or vacated.

As to

default judgments, the matter is one of discretion.

Here,

however, we submit that after denying the motion for new
trial the court had no jurisdiction to vacate the judgment and
further, if by any strained construction it is felt that jurisdiction and power still remained to vacate the judgment, the
court grossly abused its discretion in granting the motion to
vacate.
At this time by the judgment roll, your court has before
it all of the facts, re.:ords and affidavits before the District
Court on these is:;ues. You may review the same as to facts
and law and determine the issues.

You are not bound by

the Order of the District Court. You should by your decision,
reinstate the first judgment entered herein in favor of the
plaintiff and appellant.
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ARGUMENT V.

We urge that the Distfict Court further erred and abused
its discretion in allowing the defendant to amend his answer,
after trial, after denial of his Motion for New Trial and after
the t'acating of the judgment. As heretofore indicated, the
defendant's attorney participated in the frist trial of the case
upon the issues created by the pleadings. He cross-examined
the plaintiff and then months later the defendant completely
altered the theor r of his defense. Even this was again altered
after final judgment by a Second Amended Answer.
No equitable basis for amendment was asserted. No
new evidence or other grounds were alleged. No surprise is
even initimated as a supporting reason for the multiple
shifting of theory. It is our firm contention that the court
erred to the prejudice of the plaintiff (appellant) in tolerating
such vacillating conduct.
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully and emphatically
urges that your Honorable Court review this matter fully and
thereupon enter rc.n order cancelling and annuling the second
judgment entered in this case, (on January 10, 1949) and
that the October 15th, 1948 Order Vacating Judgment be
annuled and the original judgment signed and filed April 9,
1948 be fully reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON,

Attorneys for Appellant
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